attached lo his reading of Aristotle's Ethics.^ This is no doubt a consequence ot the fact that the key sources remain still unpublished, most importantly, the 1925/25 lecture course on Plato's Sophist, which began with a long discussion of the Sixth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics.' The reserve on the part of the secondary literature is, however, more than made up for by the impact Heidegger's course had on the students who attended it, an impact which eventually came to fruition in two particularly significant works of philosophy. The first of these is Hannah Arendt's The Human Condition, which, even if it does not mention Heidegger by name, is governed by the distinction between HQQ^I^ and TToir]o«;, first learned in his seminars on Aristotle/ The second is Gadamer's Truth and Method, where the distinction between ^gowjoi^ and T£xvr] is appealed to in order to establish the kind of knowledge which characterizes the human sciences." And both Arendt and Gadamer agree that it is not simply the failure to make the distinction which has distorted our understanding of the nature of politics and of the human sciences, but the predominance ofrexvr] and 71011701^1 Meanwhile ^QOVT^OI^ and ngS^iq have fallen into oblivion, although the manner in which they have done so is not sufficiently clearly articulated by either Arendt or Gadamer.
So far as possible I want this essay to avoid speculating on the details of Heidegger's reading of the Sixth Book of Aristotle's Ethics. Nor do I intend to contrast Heidegger and Aristotle. Such comparisons between thinkers can be multiplied indefinitely, but the philosophical assimiptions underlying enterprises of that kind have been challenged by Heidegger,in my view definitively. My question here is, in one sense at least, neither artificial nor extrinsic, but Heidegger's own. With reference to Being and Time and the Marburg lectures, it is the question of the destruction of the history of ontology. And, without wishing to restrict Heidegger to a single reformulation of his relation to previous thinking, that question subsequently came to be understood by him as that of the transformation of language at another beginning. Within the terms of that question or questions, I shall pose the further question of the place of ngS^i^ with regard to the dominance metaphysics grants to no(Y)oi^, How far and in what way that is a question which properly belongs to Heidegger or even can be profitably pursued with reference to Heidegger cannot and should not be decided in advance.
To begin with Being and Time, it has frequently been said that with his analysis of the worldhood of the world Heidegger attempted to transfer to readiness to hand (Zuhandenheit) the priority traditionally accorded to presence at hand (Vorhandenheit).
This impression has no doubt been encouraged by the fact the Heidegger claims quite explicitly to have deprived Vorhandenheit and pure intuition of their priority,* a priority which, he also says, served as the foundation of Western philosophy since Parmenides.^" But in referring Vorhandenheit to Zuhandenheit Heidegger does not attempt to offer an alternative foundation for ontology. It is not the task of so-called fundamental ontology to offer a
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The Fate of the Distinction Between Praxis and Poiesis rival thesis to that which has been maintained by the tradition. This is not simply a consequence of the fact that in Being and Time Heidegger explicitly puts in question the methodological tendency to derive everything and anything from a simple 'primal ground.'^^ In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Heidegger explains, even more clearly that he does in Being and Time itself, that fundamental ontology does not attempt to issue a challenge to Greek philosophy: "neither being not time need be deprived of the meanings which they have had until now, but a more primordial explication of these terms must establish their justification and their limits."^' This is also what is meant by the so-called repetition or fetching back of ancient philosophy.The destruction of the traditional content of ancient ontology is not so much directed against that ontology as against its standard interpretation, which has come to provide an obstacle to its appreciation, blocking our access to the original experiences in which the first ways of determining the nature of being were achieved.^* But Heidegger is clear that that may mean examining what philosophy has always overlooked, because of a certain naivetS on the part of ancient ontology.^'
When we look to Heidegger's lectures and essays for an illustration of this process of referring traditional concepts to the experiences underlying them, we find that he frequently points to the importance of the experience of production for the development of the concepts of philosophy. In a lecture-course delivered during 1927, the same year in which Being and Time appeared, Heidegger insisted that whereas the Kantian interpretation of existence is governed by perception, the interpretation of existence offered by ancient thought and Scholasticism was governed by productive behavior. This has important implications for the reading of Being and Time, as Heidegger himself indicates, when he restates the point in its own unmistakeable terminology. The present at hand is "before the hand" and so in relation to Dasein, And it is so as something produced.^' This reference of presence at hand to production is something of a surprise after Being and Time, where it is primarily referred to theory and to knowledge. Even more puzzling might be the suggestion that for the Greeks "a being is synonomous with a present at hand disposable'' {vorhandenes VerfUgbares), for disposability had earlier on the same page been identified as the character of things of use, the ready to hand.^^ But this is no contradiction: present at hand and ready to hand are not opposed to each other as two separate realms, but rather belong together in what Heidegger, in an earlier lecture course, called "an exchange of presence."^* It is not simply that, as Heidegger insists, the Greek word ovoCa bears the pre-philosophical meaning of "disposable possessions and goods" along with its philosophical meaning. This pre-philosophical meaning in some way also belongs to ancient ontology, which is not fully cut off from its pre-philosophical roots until the language of philosophy shifts from Greek to Latin. But ancient ontology, while harbouring this meaning, nevertheless fails to articulate it and this is what constitutes, according to Heidegger, its naivetE. Hence Heidegger can at this time conceive his task not as the overcoming of ancient ontology, but as the explicit elaboration of its basis.The explicit recognition of the ready to hand in its relation to the present at hand and the acknowledgement of the determinative role of the experience of production belong to that elaboration.
If there are still any residual doubts about the crucial significance of the Greek interpretation of being in terms of production for the reading of the Analysis of Environmentality in Being and Time, then these should be dispelled following the publication of Heidegger's 1931 lecture course on Book IX of Aristotle's Metaphysics. There, in the context of a discussion of Aristotle's account of the Imcrnj^rj noirirno^ or rex^n* Heidegger refers to the interpretation of production (Herstellen) given by Plato and Aristotle and repeats that the basic concepts of philoisophy have developed from this interpretation. He then explains that "it is necessary to clarify what it means that man has a relation to the works which he produces. It is for this reason that a certain book called Being and Time talks of dealings with equipment."" The remark still leaves unexplained the precise purpose of the discussion of equipment in Being and Time, but it leaves in no doubt that the importance of the discussion will be overlooked if we focus only on the supposed novelty of the descriptions to be found there, or its 'phenomenological' credentials, and yet at the same time ignore its relation to previous thinking. As Heidegger says in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, "the existential analytic of existence does not have as an objective a description of how we manage a knife and fork.'"^ But what then is the significance of these references to Greek ontology for the reading of Being and Time! The account of equipmentality in Being and Time is not an account of production as such, but of our relation with things which have been produced. Nevertheless, these two are not so very different, given the way that our relation with what has been made exhibits the goals which akeady control production. A thing is made to be useful and its making is already governed by the use to which it is to be put. Furthermore, the relations governing production and those governing use are not simply similar, but we understand them to be integrated. Just as the materials which are taken up and used when something is being made are already conceived from the standpoint of the product in the sense of the idea that the producer has in advance, so we understand that idea in its turn to have been conceived from the standpoint of the task for which the product is intended. Such a sequence of means and ends, whereby each end is in turn the means for something else, lends to a notorious infinite regress, which a number of philosophers have entertained, including Aristotle. It is with reference to this dilemma that in Book One of the Nicomachean Ethics he introduces his examination of the idea of the Good. He subsequently returns to the problem in Book Six with his discussion of the oficvaca. It is a similar regress that provides the context for Kant's introduction of human being as an end in itself. When Heidegger appeals in Being and Time to the nodon of the for-the-sake-of-The Fate of the Distinction Between Praxu; and Poiesis which (das Worumwillen), he addresses the same problem to which these earlier thinkers were responding." This is confirmed by the way Heidegger introduced the for-the-sake-of-which in his lectures, not only with reference to Kant's account of the end itself, but also in order to elucidate the OVIVEKQ both as it occurs in Plato's discussion of the good in the Sixth Book of the Republic and in Aristotle's Sixth Book of the Ethics. '' To emphasize these historical connections is not to diminish what Heidegger sought to accomplish in his thinking during this period. Having characterized his thinking as a repetition, it stood removed from the inside-outside opposition which tends to dominate contemporary discussions of the relation of thinking to its forebears. Hence we should not be surprised to find a reference to npa|at the very point in Being and Time where Heidegger introduces the notion of equipment. He writes, "The Greeks had an appropriate name for 'things': itQaypiara -that is to say, that with which one has to do in one's concernful dealings (ncal^) " And yet, in v. hat would be another example of their so-called naivetE, they failed to think the ontological character of what they named, thereby setting Heidegger the task he takes up in these sections. "Ontologically, the specifically 'pragmatic' character of the Ttpay/iara is just what the Greeks left in obscurity; they thought of these 'proximally' as 'mere things.' We shall call those entities which we encounter in concern equipment.*'** This reference to nga^u; is not to be understood in terms of Aristotle's distinction between IIQQ^I^ and TTOIVK. The sense meant is well-explained in the 1935-36 lecture course, published by Heidegger under the title Die Frage nach dem Ding. Heidegger, in a discussion of the meaning of rS liaOi^pLora, distinguishes four other Greek senses of thing: TO ^voixa, things insofar as they originate and come forth from themselves^ TO noiouiucva, things insofar as they are produced by the human hand and stand as such; TO xcnlu^Ta, things insofar as they are in use and stand at our constant disposal, whether ^voixa or noiovtjxva; and, finally, TO nQay^ara. The last named are explicated as "the things insofar as we have to do with them at all, whether we work on them, transform them, or we only look at and examine them -n^ayfiaTa, with regard to ngaiK^: here nga^u; is taken in a truly wide sense, neither in the narrow meaning of practical use (xQ^oOai), nor in the sense of ngS^ic, as moral action: ngiiu^ is all doing, pursuing and enduring, which also includes noir)0(^,"" It is this broad sense of ngay^aTQ that Heidegger evokes in Being and Time.
But even if Heidegger in section 15 of Being and Time evokes the broad meaning of nga^u;, and not its narrower sense where it is distinguished from noirjoi^, this does not resolve the fate of these terms with regard to Being and Time, I have already noted how in Section 18 Heidegger passes from the sequence of serviceability and usability to the 'for-the-sake-of-which' and how the last named is understood as echoing earlier discussions from the history of metaphysics. On this occasion I shall concentrate on the relation of Heidegger's discussion to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, although that is not to deny the importance of the other echoes of metaphysics to be heard in this section.
The focus of Heidegger's preoccupation with the Nicomachean Ethics seems always to have been the Sixth Book, where Aristotle turns from the ethical excellences to the intellectual excellences." Aristotle begins by recalling an earlier distinction between the so-called rational and irrational parts of the soul, one having the Aoyo^ and the other being without it." Aristotle then divides the former into the epistemic, which is invariable, and the deliberative, which is variable. Shoeing no concern to develop an unambiguous terminology, Aristotle then further divides the epistemic or theoretical into two parts, one of which is ao^ur, whereas the other is lmaTf\\ir\ itself. Similarly, the deliberative or practical is divided into ^Q6VY]OI<^ and TCXVT). Another name Aristotle gives to the deliberative in the 'logistical,' which is usually understood to mean the capacity for calculation." Alongside the two epistemic excellences and the two practical excellences, there is a fifth excellence, vouc, which is privileged above all others because it is concerned with first principles." This framework is of particular importance because Aristotle maintains that within both the deliberative and epistemic parts of the soul there is an ordering, so that each has a PcATibrr) £'{i^, a support faculty or disposition.
As regards the deliberative or practical, Aristotle attempts to show the superiority of ^Qovr]oi^ over TIXVY] in various ways, but a particularly decisive passage in the following, where Aristotle subordinates notr^oi^ to Thought alone moves nothing, but only thought for-the-sakeof something and concerned with action. This indeed governs novr)oi<, also, since whoever makes something always has some further end in view: that which is made is not an end in itself, it is relative and for someone. Whereas that which is done (TO nQax-xSv) is an end in itself, since doing well {ivnQaila) is the end, and what desire aims at." But what does it mean for npa4i< to govern rrouioK or for the practical to be the principle of the productive? Aristotle conceives 'principle' or acxn wi^h reference to his doctrine of the four causes. In the paraphrase attributed to Andronicus of Rhodes it is suggested that apxn here means 'efficient cause."' But this interpretation is not so much mistaken as misleading. The important point is rather that the practical is construed as the final cause of 7100701^, as is indeed suggested by the reference to the ou ivtxa in the previous sentence. Flcili^ may bear its own end in itself, but how can it be the cause of noirjaK withut being conceived as an external goal? And if we grant to Heidegger that the doctrine of the four causes has its source in the experience of making, then Aristotle's reference of nqS^ic, to causality-be it the efficient or the final cause-places it within the referential teleology of Troiryoi^." In this way
The Fate of the Distinction Between Praxis and Pofesis ngS^K^-at the very time that it is privileged over notrTaK-comes to be interpreted in the light of TTOCVK* and ^QOVT^OK; is referred to rex^n " Even if I would hesitate before declaring this passage the decisive moment in the history of the traditional subordination of ngS^K; to notnoK, it is striking that Aristotle appears to accomplish the reverse of what he intends. For when nga^K^ is construed as the goal of noir]oic,does it not cease to be nca|ic?
Aristotle's Ethics may be the fundamental philosophical source for an understanding of nc5|(<, but the transformation TTca|i< undergoes in being assimilated into the language of Aristotle's metaphysics, and the distortion if suffers when it is integrated into a structure which postpones it in favor of noiryoic, better shows the problem of sustaining a recognition of ixQa^i^ than it shows ngaii^ itself. And this problem is inherent to nQQ^i^. There is a fundamental difficulty when it comes to providing pure examples of nQa^t^, for it is not the object of a representation or of will, but is determined by the situation which calls for it. And yet it is also true that the situation does not have its meaning in advance of the action, but is only shown to be the situation that it was retrospectively in the light of the action. This retrospective determination of the situation and thus of the action itself arises, as Arendt has argued, in the construction of a story about it.'* But such story-telling is itself a form of noiY\oi<^, It would seem that n^Stic shows itself only by submitting to the manner of revealing characteristic of noir)ai^, so that it does not show itself as itself and according to its own manner of appearing, except as a trace.
When in Section 18 of Being and Time Heidegger refers the "towards which" of serviceability to the "for-the-sake-of-which," he repeats the Aristotelian integration of noiiToic and n^a|ic through the oiJ £voca, an integration which, as we have seen, distorts the nature of ncS^ic. But what is the significance of this echo or repetition even of an Aristotelian text at the heart of Heidegger's account of the worldhood of the world? Heidegger does not in fact confine the Worumwillen or for-the-sake-of-which to a form of teleological thinking. The for-the-sake-of-which is that wherein Dasein understands itself beforehand. It is that for which entities are freed, relating us to the horizon in which we are situated and on which entities may be encountered. Heidegger's introduction of the notion of horizon to elucidate the worldhood of the world and his subsequent reference to the Lichtung or clearing show instead that he is not so much underwriting as undercutting the tendency to understand the metaphysical tradition in terms of teleology. And he does this not by turning his back on that tradition, but by repeating it in order to show its primordial sources.
The lecture courses from this period shed further light on this process. In various texts Heidegger understands ^govryaK (conventionally translated as prudence or practical reason) in terms of Umsicht or circumspection and TtxyY\ as Wissen or know-how, a knowledae which is governed by Vorsicht or fore-sight as an advance-look to the fido<. In his 1927 lectures, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger ex-plains that "the view in which the equipmental context stands at first, completely unobtrusive and unthought, is the view and sight of practical circumspection, of our practical everyday orientation."" This gives circumspection a broader signification than ^QOVT^OK; as the ability to recognize what action a situation calls for, but both are ways of seeing which are not directed to this or that, but which let a situation show itself. And it alows Heidegger to say that "all producing is, as we say, fore-sighted (vor-sichtig) and circum-sighted {um-sichtig),''" Circumspective seeing is thus placed within the context of the ontological constitution of production, as it was with Aristotle. Up to this point the discussion of circumspection in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology might seem to be straight-forward phenomenological description, just as the account of the worldhood of the world in section 15 to 18 in Being and Time are usually construed in this way. But Heidegger here continues by pointing out that circumspection is prominent wherever ontology interprets what it is that is to be produced. He then suggests that even such pre-eminent expressions within Greek philosophy as tdca, cfdo^ and BtwQtiv reflect the sight which pertains to production, a sight which "does not yet need to be a theoretical contemplation in the narrower sense but is first simply looking toward the produced in the sense of circumspective self-orientation." And then, having insisted on the role of production in Greek ontology, Heidegger repeats the claim of Being and Time that the access to the present at hand to be found in intuition, votiv or even Bto^Qtiv has dominated philosophy from Parmenides through Kant. In this way the 1927 lecture course confirms that the challenge to the priority of intuition is issued not from outside the tradition, but from the experience of production underlying it. BttDQtiv is used by Greek philosophy to say intuition, but a more penetrating hearing finds in it a reference to production.
But is the point of Heidegger's investigations into the role of the experience of making in the development of the concepts of Greek ontology to be found in the opposition between production and pure theory? If that were his aim, it might be judged a serious matter that his account of production was in terms of practical circumspection. Would Heidegger not thereby have maintained the traditional indifference in which the distinction between Trofriot^ and Tr^ali^ has been held? And would he not thereby-to use the language of section six of Being and r/me-remain the victim of the self-evidence which blocks our access to primordial sources as much as the traditional privileging of theory which he had sought to put in question? Certain passages from The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Heidegger's last lecture-course at Marburg, may help us judge how appropriate such questions are.
The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic returns to the issue of transcendence which already in Being and Time was the focus of the structure designated by the for-the sake-of-which. But Heidegger makes clear jthat his approach towards such conceptions as intuition, \6ta or OECDQIQ is governed by his conviction that they remain unsuitable for
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The Fate of the Distinction Between Praxis and Poiesis thinking transcendence, because they lack a primordial rootedness in Dasein. And yet, in accordance with the explicit principle that insofar as transcendence was central to philosophy it must have come to light in all genuine philosophy-"be it only in a quite veiled way and not conceived as such""-Heidegger suggests another possibility: "Dasein was also known to antiquity as authentic action, as nca|(c."" Not that Heidegger simply reverses the traditional privileging of theory over practice. To protect himself against this misinterpretation, he immediately warns that "if we now pose the problem of transcendence in connection with the problem of freedom, we must not take freedom in a narrow sense, so that it pertains to n^^lK in contradistinction to BtcDQia.'* This would lead in the direction of Kantianism. "But the problem is the common root of both intuition, flcco^fv, as well as action, n^alic." And yet, if Heidegger thereby seems to withdraw the word n^alic almost as soon as he offered it, a few lines later he returns to it as a name for the root of transcendence. "Though in Plato transcendence was not investigated down to the genuine roots, the inescapable pressure of the phenomenon nevertheless brought to light the connection between the transcendent intended by theldfo and the root of transcendence, n^S^^."" Throughout this discussion Heidegger does not mention noft^i^ Does that mean that ngSii^ is here understood to include noirjoi^l The context is, after all, what Heidegger calls "a vague historical orientation to Plato's doctrine of ideas."*' Or could it be that Heidegger here means by "authentic action," ngi^i^ as opposed to noirjoi^? When Heidegger recalls at the end of the discussion that the ou ivtxQ ("as that for-the-sake-of-which something is, is not or is otherwise")*' is particularly prominent in Aristotle, docs Heidegger hear in the oii tvaca a trace of npa^ic in the narrow sense, "be it only in a quite veiled way and not conceived as such," to use the phrase he introduced earlier in the discussion? To what extent docs nQttii^ survive its interpretation as the K/oca of noii^oi^l Is it only the poietic that-to recall Heidegger's description of the linguistic work The passages just quoted show that Heidegger's thinking is concerned with the question of transcendence rather than with the traditional distinction between theory and practice. Hence the difficulties which arise when one tries to construe Heidegger's scattered remarks on this theme in Being and Time as representing a single position of his own. There is some equivocation as to whether Heidegger asserts the primacy of the practical or whether he simply dissolves the distinction between theory and practice/* But this ambiguity is not accidental. It is a consequence of the ambiguity within metaphysics itself concerning the question of the relative priority of intuition or theory on the one hand and the experience of production on the other. In finding support for the latter in the form of the priority of readiness to hand, Heidegger remains within the confines of a repetition of Greek ontology. Significantly the ambiguity which surrounds the question of the relative priority of theory and practice in Being and Time reappears in later texts with reference to the dominance of the one or the other within the history of metaphysics. So one text asserts the supremacy of decoQia for Greek life,** while another from roughly the same time insists that "Plato experiences everything present as an object of making, indeed, decisively for the sequel.'*** These references could be multiplied. I introduce them only to make all the more plausible my suggestion that the equivocation concerning the question of theory and practice in Being and Time arises from metaphysics itself and appears there in fulfilment of the task of the repetition and destruction of the history of ontology. Heidegger's discussion of theory and practice does not decide in favour of one or the other, nor is the distinction regarded as ultimate.
Both of the questions raised by a reading of these pages of The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic-the question of the nature of nga^i^ and the question of the distinction between theory and practice-are taken up more explicitly in the "Letter on Humanism"; and I shall take them up again in that context. Otherwise Heidegger focuses explicitly on TTCSIK only rarely; and his sights are clearly set on noir^au;. Furthermore, this is not always the broad conception of noir^oi^ which includes TT^alic, in the way that n^a^i^ may be understood to include nou]-01^ both in Being and Time and the 1935/36 lectures referred to earlier. Rather, noir^ou^ is in these late works often expressly referred to the experience of making. Heidegger's early observation that a number of the most important Greek philosophical concepts were originally determined with reference to production is repeated. So, for example, in "The Origin of the Work of Art" Heidegger repeats the general conviction already stated in Being and Time that "what seems natural to us is probably just something familiar in a long tradition that has forgotten the unfair source from which it arose."*' He then proposes that the formmatter distinction in its universal application refers originally to the process of making and the interrelation of form and matter controlled beforehand by the purposes for which the thing in made.** Similarly, the 1962 "Seminar on the Lecture Time and Being" shows the importance of the experience of making for Western metaphysics by sketching an account of metaphysics in terms of it. The presencing of what is present is interpreted by Aristotle as noinoi^ from which it passes to subsequent metaphysics, where it comes to be understood as creatio, and later still as "positing" with reference to the transcendental consciousness of objects. "The fundamental characteristic of the letting-presence of 120
The Fate of the Distinction Between Praxis and Poiesis metaphysics is production {Hervorbringen),'' Only Plato's role in this history is left deliberately unclear, with his references to light more prominent than those to TTOIVK, particularly at first/' It would require a more detailed survey than I could possibly offer here in order to try and make sense of the different emphases of Heidegger's various accounts of the place of 7100701^/° It is sufficient in the present context to show that in his reflections on noiY]oi(, Heidegger devdoped another relation to Greek thinking to that found in the Marburg period. This is most readily done with reference to the 1953 lecture "Question concerning Technology." This lecture contains Heidegger's most far-reaching thoughts on the role of TTOIVK, and the discussion is more carefully articulated than elswhere. So, for example, he draws attention to the breadth of the Greek conception of nofnotc, which should be understood to include +UOK as well.'' Furthermore, he emphasises that the translation 'making' is inadequate to the Greek understanding of Tro/r^oi^, which means something more like 'bringing forth. ' And yet nowhere in "The Question Concerning Technology" does Heidegger mention ncSli^. The omission might not at first appear very serious, although it is at least surprising when one observes that Heidegger specificahy refers to Nicomachean Ethics Book VI, chapters 3 and 4, where, in what he calls a "discussion of special importance," Aristotle distinguishes between bu(jv^\iy] and lixy^. But of course, as everyone knows Aristotle's discussion of the intellectual excellences also names ^Q6vr]Oic, vouc and oo^ur. Does it matter that Heidegger has given only a partial presentation of Aristotle's account? This misrepresentation of Aristotle might simplify Heidegger's attempt to show the centrality of notrioKc, within metaphysics, but it is no more than an easily recognized short cut. Heidegger is in this passage more concerned with focusing on Aristotle's acknowledgement that ot\r\dtia in the sense of revealing belongs to the ancient words for knowing in the broadest sense, Tc^vr? and cnioTrffi^, than with their narrower delimitation in Aristotle. Can Aristotle's testimony be ignored in this way? Certainly ^QQvr]oi^, as the kind of knowing corresponding to n^alK, is also a revealing." But does not this support Heidegger's presentation less than it challenges it?
In order to appreciate the role of "The Question Concerning Technology" within the broader framework of Heidegger's thinking, it is important to recognize that in this essay he returns, even if only briefly and implicitly, to the structure already elucidated in Being and Time as the for-the-sake-of-which. Heidegger takes up Heisenberg's description of the technological age as one in which "it seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself."*' Human beings are encouraged in their posture as "lords of the earth'* by the illusion that everything they encounter is their own construct. Heidegger, however, does not limit himself to the familiar observation that wherever we go we encounter man-made creations: the tools of everyday life, machine prepared food and a countryside radically transformed by humanity. These were the phenomena to which Heidegger referred in the lecture to which Heidegger directs us. Heidegger was concerned with the conception of truth in science and the recognition that science does not investigate nature as such, but only, for example, our knowledge of particles." By contrast, Heidegger's observations extend to what he calls the blocking of rroirjoi^, the annihilation of the thing and the refusal of the world. That is to say, in the technological age, the age of Gestelh the horizon of the for-the-sake-of-which has collapsed in on human beings.
Heidegger approaches the same theme elswhere through his interpretation of Protagoras' saying that "man is the measure of all use things (xc»1M»Ta)." That "man always encounters only himself" can be understood as the modern counterpart of Proagoras' saying." This does not mean that the latter is to be understood with reference to modern technology, but rather the reverse; technology derives historically from T£xvr] as a mode of ahr\{ltvtiv," And yet what allows this history to be recognized is the sense in which it has completed itself. This is what lies behind Heidegger's statement in the essay on technology that is an illusion-indeed "the final delusion"-to suppose that man encounters only himself. It is an illusion because in this situation human beings in fact fail to encounter themselves in their essence, that is to say as addressed by being. But in "The Question Concerning Technology," and also the essay "The Turning," Heidegger proceeds to show that the refusal of the world is that which allows revealing to be recognized as such. That is why it is described as the final delusion. The annihilation of the thing in the age of technology functions somewhat like the default of equipment in Section 16 of Being and Time and, as the latter revealed what was called the worldhood of the world, the former shows "the innermost indestructible belongingness of man within granting."*' It is not a question of revitalizing our appreciation of ancient ontology by returning to its sources, but rather of another beginning, albeit that this too cannot take place without reference to the first. This is why Heidegger must follow the lesson taught by HWderHn in the poem Patmos:
Wo aber Gefahr ist, wdchst Das Rettende auch.
Where danger is, that which rescues Burgeons too.
Having recognized the decisive role of noirjoi^ within metaphysics, Heidegger does not turn his back on it, but attempts to come to terms with metaphysics through noir]oi^. That is also what lay behind his attempt to reinterpret the traditional doctrine of the four causes mentioned earlier.
Here the multiplicity of meanings of noir^ou^ which play off each other throughout the essay are made to culminate in a series of questions which lead to noirjoi^ in the sense of poetry and the fine arts in the sense
of T^x^r], an association already prepared for in **The Origin of the Work of Art."" Heidegger asks if TTOIVK in the sense of poetry could not found anew "our vision of that which grants and our trust in it.''^' His official answer is that "no one can tell," but the import or the question-and that is what Heidegger would have us attend to-is more positive. It is not simply an idle hope. It is a pious hope, expressed in the piety of questioning and based on the account of the history of metaphysics in terms of noir^oi^. Poetry here does not mean everything that usually goes under the name of poetry. Other essays of the same period suggest that the sense of poetry operative here is related to that of "poetic dwelling." So, for example, in the essay ". . .dichterisch wohnet der Mensch, . ." poetry is explicitly associated not only with notVic, which is mentioned only in passing, but also with building. "Poetry is, as a letting dwell, a kind of building."" Two further kinds of building are also identified: first, the cultivation of what produces growth out of itself and, secondly, the construction of buildings and other works made by hand. Heidegger identifies these as, respectively, colere and cultura, on the one hand, and aedjficare, on the other.*' But could they not also be referred to ^VOIQ and noir\oi(;l UOIY^OK; in its narrow sense could be associated with aedificare and by the same token building, as Heidegger understands it here, suggests noiY)oi(; in its broader sense. And yet poetry is not simply one more kind of building among others, but another kind of building, the incipient (anfdnglich) form of building. It lets dwell because it is the authentic guaging or measure of the dimension of dwelling." In this notion of measuring which is developed at some length in the essay, one can hear an answer to Protagoras. But how are we to understand 'dwelling'? In lectures and essays in the 1940's Heidegger offers it as his translation of the Greek %Bo(, and thereby refers it to ethics." The relation between ^00^ and ethics was indeed specifically acknowledged by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics," Furthermore, Aristotle takes it for granted that, as the intellectual excellence which corresponds with the ethical excellences, ^povnoic arises out of r\Bo^, To attempt to establish a relation between dwelling in Heidegger and Aristotle's ^povr^oi^ would seem an artificial enterprise were it not for the 1951 lecture "Building, Dwelling, Thinking." I propose that its title should be understood as a form of rememberance of Aristotle's threefold division l)etween the theoretical, the practical and the poetic or productive." Heidegger observes that we are accustomed to think of "dwelling and building as related as end and means."" This is indeed how ^QovY]Oic and ttxyt] present themselves in Aristotle as a consequence of the integration of noinoK and npa|ic within a single system or framework. And later in the essay Heidegger is more explicit about the deficiencies of the Greek understanding in this realm. Heidegger suggests that the Greek conception of rtyvY] is not adequate to building in its narrow sense as construction. He writes, "The erecting of buildings would not be suitably defined even if we were to think of it in the sense of the original Greek ttyyr] as solely a letting appear, which b]*ings something made, as something present, among the things that are alrsidy present."*' As in ". . . poetically man dwells ..." Heidegger refers the twin senses of building as cultivating and as constructing to a third sense building as dwelling. So it is not only production as understood in terms of outcome or results which is deemed insufficient. Even the broader conception of Tcxvrj leaves unthought the relation of building to dwelling and so overlooks the essence of building as letting dwell: "To build is in itself already to dwell."" Heidegger is saying that the inadequacy of the Greek concept of TExvt] lies in its failure to think the nature of dwelling, a failure which is no doubt enhanced at the hands of Aristotle by its distinction from ^Qovr}oi(;, with its trace of dwelling. Heidegger is concerned to combat the idea that building and dwelling are two separate activities. One should not be fooled by the fact that Heidegger calls the distinction "correct."" This is one of Heidegger's favorite ways of dismissing an idea which he regards as insufficiently fundamental.
It is only with explicit reference to metaphysics that Heidegger can think in a way which is other than that of metaphysics. That is why in my reading of such essays as "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" I emphasize the references to metaphysics to be found there. This is not to reduce what Heidegger says to what might already be found in metaphysics. Nor is it to establish a comparison external to the essential movement of the text, as the reference to rtxyr) in the essay shown. 'Building' should not be reduced to noirpi^, nor 'dwelling' to ^gSyrpi^, nor 'thinking' to OtwQia, And yet the words of the former chain can be thought only with reference to the latter. The rememberance of metaphysics is the only way in which the otherness of another beginning can be maintained. The fashionable swift dismissal of metaphysics is as self-defeating as a halfhearted rejection of metaphysics is pointless. The thinking of another beginning does not oppose itself to metaphysics, because nothing would be more metaphysical than that. Heidegger attempts to think what the Greeks left unthought in the only way that is possible-with reference to what the Greeks did think. Heidegger makes exactly this point at the end of the 1957 lecture: "The Principle of Identity": "Only when we turn thoughtfully toward what has already been thought, will we be available for what must still be thought."'* This can be iUustrated with reference to the central thought of the essay "Building, Dwelling, Thinking." In the first instance it is expressed only negatively. Heidegger says there that "dwelling is never completely thought of as the basic character of human being."" But althought it has neither been thought nor experienced, when Heidegger comes to say it in his 1944 lecture course on Heraclitus he chose to say it in Greek and indeed in an echo of the traditional metaphysical definition of human being: avOcconoc Cciov nOoc £xov." This is not the preferred way of saying it. At the end of "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" Heidegger offers the formula: "Dwelling is the basic character of Being in keeping with which mortals exist."" But if it seems significant that in "Building, Dwelling,
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Thinking" Heidegger shows himself prepared to leave Greek behind and draw instead on Old English and High German to say and to establish the character of dwelling, then it should not be forgotten that in the twelfth section of Being and Time he had, with Grimm's assistance, already turned to ancient German and for the same purpose. Ancient German is not an alternative source to ancient Greek to be preferred because it might be somehow outside metaphysics. What differentiates the early attempts to fetch back wiederholen) metaphysics from later attempts to take the step back {Schritt zurtick) into the essence of metaphysics is Heidegger's deeper appreciation of the situation from which thinking today must make its start. And the difference has already been outlined with reference to his understanding of the essence of technology and of the final delusion to which we seem to succumb at the time of technology.
There is a tendency to want to understand dweUing as Heideggei s name for the condition to which he would like to lead us, a condition which would hopefully follow the technological world or rather its refusal of world. But this is to withhold from dwelling the place Heidegger gives it, a place which is at once both more provisional and more fundamental. In "The Turning" he writes that "unless man first establishes himself beforehand in the space proper to his essence and there takes up his dwelling, he will not be capable of anything essential within the destining now holding sway.'"* This helps to explain the outrageous statement with which Heidegger ends "Building, Dwelling, Thinking." It runs: "As soon as man gives thought to his homelessne^, it is a misery no longer.'"' It shows just how far remembrance of r^Qoc, might be from what would today pass for ethics. Can the statement be conceived as anything other than a mark of Heidegger's failure to come to terms with the split between theory and practice? It is surely not enough simply to say that Heidegger would not want to deny the need for new houses, but sees homelessness as a deeper problem than that of their construction. Ultimately Heidegger is saying that were we able to think, then we would already be dwelling. This is the import of my quotation from "The Turning," as also perhaps of the constant refain from What Is Called Thinking? that we are still not yet thinking. Heidegger is not simply trying to shock us, though no doubt that is part of it. And he is being deadly serious. The point is that homelessness is the danger and like the blocking of noinoK it might serve as that which rescues. The possibility we must entertain is that the statement about homelessness is already such a thinking, the thinking of a turning. And if it is such, then this thinking is itself a form of nca^K.
What that might mean was already the subject of the 1947 **Letter on Humanism," which predates the essays whose focus on notV^ I have just been considering. It is the sole writing of Heidegger which announces itself as concerned with action. The opening sentence runs: "We are still far from pondering the essence of action decisively enough.'"" The question is whether Heidegger succeeds in the course of the essay to tell us anything more than that about the essence of action. He explains Lhai the laiiure arises because we think of action as causing an effect, an effect which is in turn prized for its utility. One might suppose that that means the failure arises because we think of action in terms of production. But Heidegger himself immediately explicates the essence of action as "accomplishment" (Vollbringen) which is understood as "unfolding something into the fullness of its essence" or in Latin producere. This would seem to suggest that Heidegger was content to assimilate action to production, ngS^K; to noir]oi<;. This impression is apparently confirmed when Heidegger announces his task to be that of freeing us from "the technical interpretation of thinking." The name is significant. The technical interpretation of thinking was already operative in Plato and Aristotle who, according to Heidegger, took "thinking itself to be a Texvrj, a process of reflection in service to doing and making. But here reflection is already seen from the perspective of nQot^i^ and nofrjoi^."'' This means that they understood thinking *reactively.' In an attempt to preserve the autonomy of thinking, it is set in opposition to acting and making, and thereby lets itself be determined by them. The reason why Heidegger quite properly finds the phrase 'technical interpretation of thinking' more exact than, for example, 'the practical interpretation of thinking' is that thinking is content to justify itself in terms of the service it performs. Thinking, one might say, no longer unfolds according to its essence but, removed from the element of being, it comes to serve as an instrument of education. "Philosophy gradually becomes a technique for explaining from highest causes.'"* Thinking opposes itself to the technical and the practical, but in the very process of denying the practical (in the broad sense) it becomes technical. Were it not that the "Letter on Humanism" was purportedly on action, one might readily suppose that the reference to ncalt^ in the lines quoted above was entirely redundant.
At the end of the "Letter on Humanism" Heidegger rejoins the themes with which he opened the essay, and he does so with reference to the claim that thinking acts. We are told that, by its inconsequential accomplishment of bringing the unspoken word of being to language, the thinking of being exceeds all theoria and praxis.'* What benefit it is to thinking to call it a deed is not made clear. It seems rather that the designation is more effective as a diminution of action. A little later we read: "We measure deeds by the impressive and successful achievements of praxis. But the deed of thinking is neither theoretical nor practical, nor is it the conjuncture of these two forms of behavior."** It would seem from this that the issue had been decided against ngS^i^ and that Heidegger had introduced the question of action only to serve as a foil for his discussion of thinking.
And yet the situation is perhaps not so simple. There are indications that Heidegger does address the essence of action in the "Letter on Humanism" and in the only way open to him-not directly, but discreetly. First of all, it could be suggested that npa^ic enters into the essay in Heidegger's retelling of Aristotle's account of Heraclitus's encounter with some strangers. It is a story about the difference between !h bhndness of mere curiosity and the capacity to see a situation as an opro. Heidegger translates as "for there are gods present even here.'' In a subsequent essay on Heraclitus, Heidegger writes that **thinkmg changes the world."" This is illustrated, albeit in a particular way, in the story about Heraclitus; for Heraclitus's words transform the situation. They are in this sense an action; and we know this action through a making, the story handed down for generations, until the present day." But only with Heidegger's retelling of the story does it point beyond the unity ot the metaphysical terms, unknown as such to Heraclitus, to their remembrance in building, dwelling and thinking. In a second discreet reference to the difference between rtga^t^ and noir]OK in the "Letter on Humanism" Heidegger makes what might at first appear to be only a passing remark on the difference between speech and writing. He writes to Beaufret that his questions would have been better answered in direct conversation. Writing lacks the flexibility of conversation, whereas speaking remains purely "in the element of being.'"* an element which has been deserted by the technical interpretation of thinking. On the other hand, the compensation of writing lies in its "wholesome pressure toward deliberate linguistic formulation." This, in a later passage, Heidegger refers to as "the now rare handicraft {Hand-werk) of writing" and also as carefulness in saying, the cultivation of the letter." A possible example of this rare handicraft might be found in his use of typography at the end of the "Letter on Humanism" and indeed in the two passages referred to earlier where Heidegger sought to place thinking beyond the distinction between theory and practice. In both cases Heidegger refers to "praxis" and not to ngci^ic, in the Greek alphabet, which is his practice elsewhere in the essay." This is perhaps Heidegger's way of indicating that in juxtaposing thinking with praxis, he is addressing not "authentic TTC34IC," but praxis in its metaphysical determination, which we could call the 'technical interpretation of npali^.' In both passages Heidegger refers to the achievements (Leistungen) of praxis, and not its accomplishment {Vollbringen).
But it was this latter word which had at the beginning of the essay defined the essence of action. At the end of the essay it is used only of the thinking of being and the humbleness of its inconsequential accomplishment. Inconsequential" means here that it is not judged in terms of its effects, not prized according to its utility. In other words, praxis does not display the essence of action.
At the same time and in the same way, Heidegger writes that the thinking of being exceeds theoria; and as with the similar remarks about praxis, he avoids the use of the Greek alphabet. The explanation is no different in this case, but it is perhaps clearer to see. It should be recalled that at the beginning of the essay Heidegger had outlined his task of freeing us from the technical interpretation of thinking. "The characterization of thinking as Oeo)Qia and the determinktion of knowing as 'theoretical' behavior occur already within the 'technical' interpretation of thinking."" That is to say, the technical interpretation of thinking is as much a reduction of 9eu)Qia as it is of thinking. It is theoria, not 9e-(jjQia, which is so easily surpassed. Underlying Heidegger's discussion of OtcDQia and nQa^iQ in the "Letter on Humanism" and unknown to the first readers of this essay is the 1942/43 lecture course on Parmenides, where both words are given an originary meaning. Indeed the account of nga^K^ there recalls the discussion twenty-five years earlier in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Heidegger no longer writes of transcendence, but of uQayyia as "the one original inseparable whole of the relation between things and men."" We should allow the possibility that the word is given a fundamental status on both occasions and that as such it also underlies the "Letter on Humanism."
When Heidegger said that thinking acts, he was not diminishing the notion of action, however much it might sound like it from a com temporary perspective. But neither should one claim too much for this particular formulation. As he has himself reminded us, prior to the opposition of the theoretical and the practical the Greeks thought of dtcoQia as the highest form of doing." They too could have made sense of his sentence, although not as Heidegger himself understood it. The full meaning of the saying that thinking is the most decisive form of action is, as the so-called Athens lecture of 1967 tells us, that it is through thinking that the world-relation of human beings can first begin to change. In other words, thinking acts through its role in the epochal destiny of the history of being. But above all, thinking is called to act at the time of the final delusion and the refusal of the world. And yet he makes clear that if thinking is to act then it must escape the inadequate distinction between theory and praxis by taking the step back to what was unthought in the beginning of Western thinking to what was already named there and so dictated to our thinking-the inner connection between ^voi^ and r^xyrf,"
Heidegger, in the "Letter on Humanism," may separate thinking from theory and praxis, but that does not mean that it is a narrow conception of thinking. 'Thinking' as understood there already points in the direction of building and dwelling, and not as a conjunction of terms, but through their inner connection. This is already suggested by the references to dwelHng in the course of the essay and the reference to poetry Heidegger feels obliged to add at its end, albeit somewhat artificially.*^ Whether or not my comments on the story about Heraclitus and on Heidegger's use of typography are found persuasive, what is important is that it be seen that Heidegger is not indifferent to the distinction between nQa^u; and noir^oK,, like so many thinkers within metaphysics. He has not succuinb«:d to a technical interpretation of nga^iQ, which would understand il reaoMvely with reference tonoirjoK. Heidegger's treatment is impressive for its 1 esc) x'e. It would have been very easy for him to adopt the attitude which is now common whereby it is imagined that one can attain a displaced or de-con-structed concept of action simply by edict." There are those who would have us believe it is enough to record that a word is to be understood without reference to its metaphysical connotations from Aristotle or elswhere to accomplish this. The present essay has tried to indicate the difficulties of such attempts.
So long as npalt^ is understood with reference to its distinction from TToi^i^. then it amounts to "a technical interpretation of nQali^," just as Heidegger wrote in the "Letter on Humanism" of the technical interpretation of thinking. In its technical interpretation n^ali^ is only understood reactively and is thereby returned to 710^701^. But how^can TtpSlt^ be understood other than reactively, given the dominance of noiVt^ in metaphysics? Does not the distinction between noir]oi<i and HQQ^K, impose itself on our every attempt to circumvent it, even if it is a distinction which is impossible to maintain any longer in its metaphysical form?
Simply to ignore the distinction between npa^i^ and noiY]Oiq is to succumb to the metaphysical dominance of noiY]Oi(,. But to insist on n^a^K in contradistinction to noir\oi<, is still to remain in the orbit of metaphysics. Heidegger seeks in the early Greek language an understanding of ncalic-as also of TTorr)oi<;-which might be said to be prior to their difference and so indifferent to it. These attempts correspond to what he was trying to say with the word 'thinking' in the "Letter on Humanism." The extent to which UQQ^K, might originally have been undecided with regard to the standard alternatives is quite other from its broad metaphysical sense, which includes both noi^Vjot^ and ngakK in the narrow sense of the words. But can we today think the early sense without reducing it to the broad sense or allowing it to be governed by the metaphysical distinction? When, in the lecture course on Heraclitus mentioned earlier, Heidegger attempts to return to an original sense of npa^ic and turns to nQSy\jLa as "the one original inseparable whole of the relation between things and men," he comes to focus on the hands. The reference to hands is supported by the German word for action {Handeln) as also the words vorhanden and zuhanden. But is this not to return action to making? Has not the hand always been the fundamental instrument of making in its distinction from action and labor?" Such considerations haunt all attempts to pose the question of nqS^K, without reference to its distinction from nou70ic
To claim to have at one's disposal a so-called deconstructed notion of action is simply to find a new way of repeating the metaphysical gesture. If the naivete of Greek ontology lay in its failure to recognize its roots, the naivety of today's attempts to overcome that ontology is to be found in the belief that we can take up what they left unthought as if we could make it our own. Heidegger confronted this difficulty by accompanyink' his attempts to think the early, the oldest of the old, with a rememberance of that which followed. He accepted the nece>sii> whereby it is only in explicit relation to the history of metaphysics that the early sense of nqakic, can address the situation in which the thinking of nga^K^ finds itself today. But to what extent could that history be conceived on the classical model? How far could it retain a similarity to the stories of the poets with beginning, middle and end? Heidegger's answer to these questions is to be found in his account of the essentially discontinuous destining of being. It is not a question simply of placing tiiie oblivion of nga^ic, within the context of the history of the dominance of nofryaic. What does that mean?
The distinction between npalic and noiryaic may quite correctly be recognized as metaphysical, and amongst philosophers it could even be said to be "exoteric" in the sense of 'familiar.' But it is "exoteric" also in another sense, that of being external to the history of metaphysics. It is metaphysical insofar as it leads to the subordination of n^Slic to noirjoic and its consequent concealment. And it is anything but a metaphysical distinction insofar as npali^ cannot be reduced to such a role and necessarily exceeds every attempt to contain it. The undoing of this subordination is a prime task of the thinking of another beginning and it can only be accomplished insofar as it thinks in rememberance of the distinction. The concealment of npali^ is not accidental, but a necessary consequence of the dominance of the poietical form of presencing. Yet Tt^a|(^-as a mark of the exoteric and not simply as one concept among others-has left its trace, and not just in Aristotle. For example, Heidegger quotes a sentence from Eckhart which can serve as an illustration of the interrupting of metaphysics on the part of npalic. This has nothing to do with the prevalence of Aristotelianism within metaphysics. Equally the fact that the passage lacks political significance in any sense which would be recognisable to Aristotle which is something which can, of course, be referred to the different conditions prevailing at the time when it was written) is not denied. But on this occasion I have left to one side the political dimension of ngSt^K^ and its place with reference to the metaphysical determination of the theoretical, practical and productive, albeit that to do so is a traditional prejudice of metaphysics, n^a^i^ in the sense of that which interrupts is neither to be measured by nor limited to a specific idea of TTQSIK which we might hold in advance.
In "The Turning" Heidegger asks the ethical question, in its traditional form: Was sollen wir /wn.^-"What should we do?"'^ It might seem that Heidegger simply evades the question, by postponing it. We must, he says, first ask, Wie mussen wir denken?-"How must we think?" But this too could be called an ethical question. I do not mean that it asks about the way moral considerations can be legitimately allowed to determine thinking. It is ethical in rememberance of the Greek sense of r]Boc,. By contrast, the ethical question in its familiar form-'what should I do?'-already conceives ethics in terms of noiY]oic,. Heidegger's deflection of the conventional question of ethics to thinking is not the straightforward evasion of ethics which it might seem." What we should do cannot be said in abstraction, because what is essential is to recognize the specific situation for what it is. The capacity to do so corresponds to what Aristotle called ^Q6VY]OI(,, and it arises from dwelling. That is why Heidegger only posed these questions after he had insisted on the importance of dwelling in the sentence earier. Between them Heidegger quotes a short sentence from Eckhart.
The sentence reads: "Those who are not of a great essence, whatever work they perform, nothing comes of it." It is drawn from Die Rede der Unterscheidung which means The Counsels on Discernment,' but also 'Discourse on Difference.' The section in which it is to be found is called, "On the Advantage of Self-abandonment which one should practice inwardly and outwardly." Eckhart there contrasts acting and being. **If you are just, then your works too are just. We ought not to think of building holiness upon action; we ought to build it upon a way of being, for it is not what we do that makes us holy, but we ought to make holy what we do. However holy the works may be, they do not, as works, makes us at all holy; but as we are holy and have being, to that extent we make all our works holy, be it eating, sleeping, keeping vigil or whatever it may be." Then comes the sentence quoted by Heidegger, and after it Eckhart's explanation. "Take good heed: We ought to do everything we can to be good; it does not matter so much what we may do, or what kinds of works ours may be. What matters is the ground on which the works are."" Within the context of Heidegger's discussion it is the notion of the ground which strikes us first. Heidegger says there that "modern man must first and above all find his way back into the full breadth of the space proper to his essence.'"^ Essence is thought differently by Eckhart and Heidegger. In Heidegger this essence is understood with reference to dwelling, and specifically to dwelling in the truth of being. For Eckhart, the great essence of man arises when man belongs to God. "A man's essence and ground-from which his works deriVe their goodness-is good when his mind (Gemiit) is wholly directed to God."
There is nothing arbitrary about Heidegger's reference to this passage. There are doubtless people who imagine that before any saying of Eckhart can properly take up a place in a text of Heidegger's it would need to be purified of its context in a thinker who the barest knowledge of historical chronology tells us belongs clearly within the time of metaphysics. But it can in fact be seen that restoring the sentence to its context in Eckhart's works allows it to contribute much more to Heidegger's own enterprise, notwithstanding that Eckhart thinks from a thoroughly different basis from that of Heidegger. Eckhart advises against becoming attached to one's works or allowing goals and plans to govern one's life. In their place he counsels being free of one's works as soon as one performs them. This idea comes to fruition in his words Gelassenheit and Abgeschiedenheit.
Heidegger's adoption of the first of these is well known. Many of his readers would prefer to free the word completely from its heritage, regarding that as only something accidental and without fundamental significance. But rememberance does not always simply draw thinking back into metaphysics. "Whatever and however we may try to think, we think within the sphere of tradition.
